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ABSTRACT:  In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic 
politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data 
for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation 
where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that 
tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more 
‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the 
incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal 
seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central 
and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are 
influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that 
programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity 
of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy 
and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between 
a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income. 
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1.- Introduction 
The inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment redistributes money from some 
regions (those that pay taxes) to the others (those where the investment is made). So this 
infrastructure investment can be qualified as a redistributive policy. According to Dixit and 
Londregan (1996, p.1132-33), the politics of redistributive policies can be classified into two 
different forms. On the one hand, we have tactical redistribution, in which the benefits 
(building the infrastructure) are paid to a few regions while the costs are shared by all the 
regions. The implicit assumption here is that the government has full discretion in the 
allocation of monies to the regions, so the allocation criterion is simply: if I invest in your 
region (and not in other regions having similar economic traits), it is more probable that I 
will remain in power?. On the other hand, we have programmatic redistribution, in which the 
government withdraws resources from some regions and distribute them to others (i.e, the 
regions where the infrastructures are built), with electoral considerations in mind, but subject 
to some constraints in the selection of beneficiaries, mostly to have a certain income level. 
Programmatic benefits, therefore, have public good qualities: they redistribute from a given 
class a beneficiaries to another (from rich to poor regions), but within a class of beneficiaries, 
particular regions who qualify cannot be excluded.  
Most existing studies of the politics of inter-regional allocation of infrastructure invest-
ment consider it as merely tactical. This is clearly the case of the papers by Knight (2002, 
2004), Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), Cadot et al. (2006) and Joanis (2007), for the US, 
Spain, France and Canada, respectively1. This view might have been influenced by the U.S. 
literature on legislative ‘pork barrel’ politics (see, e.g., Wright, 1974; Shepsle and Weingast, 
1981). There is probably enough accumulated evidence to conclude that this focus on tactical 
politics might be legitimate in the U.S case. However, this approach might be on occasions 
too narrow, disregarding traits of the allocation of resources which, if not in the U.S., are of 
crucial importance elsewhere. As Rodden (2009) clearly shows in a recent survey, there are 
countries (e.g., Canada, Germany, Australia, Spain, or the European Union) were there is a 
political rhetoric, in some cases enshrined in the constitution, whereby residents of the 
poorest regions are entitled to the same public services at the same cost as residents of the 
                                                 
1 This is also the focus of the many other papers analysing the political determinants of intergovernmental 
grants (see, e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Case, 2001; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002; Johansson, 2003). 
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wealthiest regions. This might take the form of inter-personal transfers, but it might also take 
the form of subsidies for local public goods as infrastructure in regions with limited tax base. 
The politics of these transfers are programmatic, which means that allocations are to be 
based on general ‘objective’ principles, using rules and formulas which limit governmental 
discretion. It would be interesting to gauge how these principles and rules were adopted, and 
how do they really influence the final allocation of monies to the regions.  
This is specially relevant in the case of infrastructure provision, because it is not 
entirely clear what ‘objective’ principles means in this case, since infrastructure investment 
could be directed either to regions with high project impact, following an efficiency criterion, 
or to regions with low output levels (to foster convergence), thus following an equity 
criterion (Yamano and Ohkawara, 2000; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). The degree of redis-
tribution observed in a given country depends in part on details of the constitutional contract 
which, as in Spain or the EU, might be the basis for the implementation of a regional 
cohesion policy (De la Fuente, 2004). However, although constitutions constraint the options 
that government have regarding inter-regional redistribution, the evolution of the ideological 
preferences of parties and voters, and the territorial structure of power in a democracy could 
also determine the final equity-efficiency orientation of public policies, in general, and of 
infrastructure investment, in particular. In this context, rich regions might be in a disadvan-
taged situation when the territorial structure of electoral power and income do not overlap 
(e.g., poor regions are over-represented in the legislature), a fact that depends both on the 
electoral rules set in the constitution and on the temporal evolution of regional income 
inequalities.  
Despite of this interest, however, no papers to our knowledge have really focused on 
the programmatic politics of the inter-regional allocation infrastructure investment. Rodden 
(2009) tries to explain why intergovernmental transfers are more or less redistributive in a 
selected sample of nine countries, providing a range of institutional motives. Rodden’s paper 
goes one step beyond the many others that just measure (but do not explain) the inter-
territorial redistributive effects of government programs (see, e.g., Bayoumi and Masson, 
1994; Bosch et al., 2003). The equity-efficiency trade-off of regional public investment 
policies has been analyzed by Yamano and Ohkawara (2000), Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) 
and Stephan and Kemmerling (2009), for the cases of Japan, Spain, and several EU countries, 
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respectively. The last two papers also include a political analysis, but confined to the tactical 
motives, and thus do not try to explain the political reasons of the weight given to equity and 
efficiency considerations. In the Spanish case, some papers have previously analysed the 
rules implicit in the territorial distribution of public investment (Bosch and Espasa, 1999; De 
la Fuente, 2004). These papers do not account for political factors, which have been 
discussed by Boix (1998), Vives and De la Fuente (1998), and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005). 
This last paper focused of the period 1986-96, enough to bring evidence on the workings of 
tactical politics in Spain but too short to provide any meaningful political change which 
helps to analyze programmatic influences (e.g., the left controlled the government during all 
sample years).  
The purpose of this paper is to study the politics of the inter-regional allocation of 
infrastructure investment, providing evidence on the relative importance of both tactical and 
programmatic motives. With this aim, we have assembled a database for Spain covering the 
years 1964-2004, with electoral district (‘provincia’) data on central governments’ infrastruc-
ture provision and capital stock, and economic and political variables. The main focus of our 
analysis will be the democratic period 1978-2004, the only for which it has sense to ask 
about (measurable) political influences. The results of the dictatorship period (1964-1977) 
will be used for comparison purposes, in order to guess the effects of the arrival of the 
democracy on the degree of inter-territorial redistribution. The methodology is similar to the 
one used in Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005). We use pooled data to estimate an equation, where 
investment depends on economic (i.e., income per capita, capital stock, land area, coastal 
dummy) and tactical political influences (i.e., the incumbent’s vote margin of victory/defeat 
in the last election, the votes needed to win an additional seat in the legislature, the partisan 
alignment between central and regional executives, and the fact that some regional parties 
have been pivotal at the central level during some periods). The results suggest that both 
‘objective’ economic variables and tactical motives play a role in determining the amount of 
infrastructure investment allocated to a district. To study programmatic politics we pool the 
full sample to estimate a random coefficients model, allowing the income coefficient (which 
we interpret as indicative of the equity-efficiency trade-off) to include a random term and to 
interact with variables picking up the main political forces which might influence it. We find 
that this coefficient decreased with the arrival of the democracy, has been considerably lower 
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for left governments and for right governments before contested elections, and shows a 
statistically significant relation with the correlation between per capita income and a measure 
of ‘political power’ (i.e., the intensity of redistribution is mitigated as richer regions become 
more powerful). We therefore conclude that, at least in Spain, both tactical and 
programmatic motives matter for the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide an interpretative 
framework for our analysis. In section three we describe our empirical strategy. In section 
four we present our data and explain how we have computed the different variables. In 
section five we present the results obtained. The last section concludes. 
 
2.- Interpretative framework 
2.1. Tactical redistribution 
Perhaps the best-known theoretical models of tactical redistribution are the ones proposed by 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1998). Both papers assume that the 
incumbent desires to stay in office, so he distributes the resources between a set of electoral 
districts with the aim of winning elections. The main empirical prediction of these papers is 
that monies will flow to swing voter districts, which are districts with a high proportion of 
relatively unattached voters (i.e., voters that are prone to change its vote if there is an 
economic gain in it). These voters are identified in practice either as the districts where the 
incumbent won or lose by a thin margin (Case, 2000; Johansson, 2003; Smart and Milligan, 
2005) or as the districts with high past vote volatility (Wright, 1974; Strömberg, 2004; 
Larcinese et al., 2006). A different model is developed by Cox and McCubbins (1986), who 
suggest that politicians are risk averse and –although also wishing to win the elections– 
prefer to send money to their core voters or ‘strongholds’, because this is a safer investment. 
Empirically, these ‘strongholds’ are identified as districts where the incumbent obtained a 
high share of votes (Johansson, 2003; Levitt and Snyder, 1995). There is some disagreement 
in the literature regarding which of the two hypotheses is more relevant (Rodden and 
Wilkinson, 2004), with a few papers finding evidence in favour of the swing voter one 
(Wright, 1974; Dalhberg and Johansson, 2002; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005) and others 
finding evidence in favour of the core voter one (Levitt and Snyder, 1995; Larcinese et al, 
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2006; Joanis, 2007). The problems in finding evidence on this might be due to the flawed 
methods used (Dalhberg and Johansson, 2002; Larcinese et al., 2008) but also to the fact that 
the two hypotheses could be difficult to disentangle given the similarity of the variables used 
to measure them (e.g., vote margin vs. vote share). Moreover, both hypotheses might be 
valid: incumbents may channel more money to thin margin districts than to places in which 
they won less votes, but also could channel more funds to core than to swing districts2. 
Other papers identify some additional factors that could also influence the allocation of 
funds to districts. First, partisan alignment between central and regional governments also 
makes the funds delivered more productive, because it impedes that the opposition claims 
some of the credit. This argument might make more sense for intergovernmental grants 
(Solé-Ollé and Sorribas, 2008; Arulampalam et al., 2009), since they are spent by the 
grantee, but in some instances it can also be applied to direct spending by the Federal govern-
ment (see, e.g., Larcinese et al., 2006). In the case of infrastructure investment, for example, 
Spanish sub-central governments act as advocates of the regions, identifying the most needed 
projects and lobbying the central government for its inclusion in the budget. Therefore, 
alignment increases the productivity of funds delivered either because the incumbent has 
more knowledge of infrastructure needs (as also happens with core voter places) or because 
voters not only reward the central layer –who is building the infrastructure–  but the sub-
central one, whose lobbying efforts considers crucial for the granting of the project.  
Second, the logic of allocating investment funds to regions might also be affected by 
electoral rules, which influence the degree of proportionality in the translation of votes to 
seats. For instance, the literature on legislative malapportionment suggests that more funds 
will be allocated to over-represented districts, since the vote of their legislators are cheaper to 
buy. This hypothesis is usually tested by looking at the effects of the vote-seat ratio on the 
regional allocation of funds (see, e.g., Atlas et al., 1995; Hauk and Wacziarg, 2007, and 
Larcinese et al., 2007, for a discussion of the US case). But these effects are not limited to 
bargaining inside the legislature, and can also affect the behaviour of unified parties 
competing for winning an election. In this case, lack of proportionality introduces 
                                                 
2 Moreover, there are some theoretical papers suggesting that the relative bias towards core or swing voters 
depends on a variety of political and institutional traits that might change from country to country and from an 
election to another. For example, Dixit and Londregan (1996) suggest that the favours towards core voters will 
be increased as the parties become more effective in delivering benefits to its own support group; Grossman and 
Helpman (2008) say these incentives depend on the degree of party discipline, and Besley (2007) suggest they 
are influenced by electoral competition. 
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discontinuities in the votes-seats relationship, creating incentives to cater to districts where 
fewer votes are needed to win an additional seat (or to lose the last seat won). This effect 
clearly operates in winner-takes-all systems (see, e.g., Snyder, 1989; Stromberg, 2008) but is 
also relevant in electoral systems with other rules that depart from perfect proportionality 
(e.g., Saint-League or d’Hondt, as in the Spanish case). In this case, the relevant variable to 
use is not the vote-seat ratio, but the exact calculation of the number of votes needed to win 
an additional seat (see, e.g., Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, and section 3 below).  
Finally, the formation of legislative coalitions opens the door to the influence of pivotal 
regions, which are those whose representatives have a higher probability of determining the 
outcome of the election. Clearly, in winner-takes-all systems, size (i.e., absolute number of 
representatives) influence the probability of being pivotal, as Stromberg (2005) demonstrates 
in the case of the US Electoral College. In parliamentary systems with two main parties, as is 
the case of Spain, this opens the door for the influence of pivotal parties which are regionally 
based. Of course, this effect appears when none of the two main parties has a clear majority 
of seats. There is some evidence that this happened in Spain during the 90’s (Castells and 
Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
A model of tactical redistribution. In the case of infrastructure investment in Spain, 
most of these empirical predictions can be accounted for using a simple framework similar to 
the ones proposed by Strömberg (2004) and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005, p.1202). Suppose 
for instance that the incumbent party at the central government allocates a fixed amount of 
investment3 across J electoral districts with the aim of maximizing the number of representa-
tives obtained in a legislative election. The incumbents’ problem can thus be written as: 
{ }J
j j jjj
ii
iniee
,...,
     :s.t.        Max                                                  
1
∑ ∑ ==                                           (1) 
Where i  is the (exogenous) amount of resources available, ji  is the per capita investment 
allocated to region j, and nj  and je  are the population and the number of representatives of 
that region  j. The FOC of this problem are 
                                                 
3 This fixed budget assumption is usual in distributive politics models (see, e.g., Cox and MacCubbins, 1986, 
and Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987) and is reasonable in our case given actual investment budgeting practices in 
Spain (see Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
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Where  vj=njFj(θj uj) are the number of votes obtained in j,  Fj  being an  incumbent’s 
vote distribution function with density fj;  ju  is the utility of a resident in j, depending on per 
capita resident income jy , which is in turn influenced by the per resident infrastructure 
capital stock of the region, jc ; jθ  is an indicator of the productivity of the efforts of the 
incumbent party in district j, which might be higher if the incumbent has better knowledge of 
districts’ infrastructure demand (recall that we said that this is to be expected to happen in 
strongholds) or if the voters are better able to attribute the responsibility for infrastructure 
delivery to the incumbents’ party (recall that we argued that this happens when there is 
partisan alignment between the central and sub-central governments); and λ  is the Lagrange 
multiplier, which accounts for the overall availability of investment funds. Expression (2) 
says that infrastructure should be allocated to equalize the marginal impact on representatives 
across regions. This marginal impact is the product of two terms: the effect of a change in 
utility on representatives and the effect of investment on utility.  
Now, we assume for convenience that Fj is a uniform distribution with support |-ηj,η j|, 
and we use very simple functions for utility and production: 
                                           ε
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+
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Where ε ≤ 0 is a parameter which affects the concavity of the utility function and 
allows us to take into account the diminishing marginal utility of income, ja  is a district-
specific productivity shifter, and jα ≥0 is the coefficient of infrastructure capital in the 
production function, which varies from district to district. Using all that information, 
knowing from the permanent inventory identity that 1=∂∂ jj i/c , and defining jjj ve ∂∂= /μ , 
we can rewrite the FOC as 
                                                  0
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Now, after taking logs and rearranging, we can provide the following expression for the 
amount of infrastructure capital desired by the incumbent for district j 
                                          jjjj yc ψln   ln  ln ++= σβ                                                  (5) 
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Where λαβ lnln −= jj , εσ +=1   and jjjj ηθμ ln   ln   ln ψln ++= . So, desired per capita 
infrastructure capital for district j increases with per capita income –but less than 
proportionally if ε<0– and with ‘political power’ jψ , which in turn is higher: (i) the lower 
the votes needed to win an additional representative ) ( jμ , (ii) the higher the productivity of 
funds channelled by the incumbent to that district )( jθ , which will be higher in strongholds 
and/or when there is partisan alignment with the sub-national government, and (iii) the higher 
the marginal voter density ) ( jη , which measures the share of swing voters or voters that are 
not strongly ideological. The only apparently relevant political factor that this framework is 
not able to account for in the Spanish case is the effect of pivotal regional parties in periods 
where the central government is in minority. Nevertheless, we will also consider this effect in 
the empirical analysis4. 
2.2. Programmatic redistribution 
It is perhaps unfair to qualify all infrastructure investment as a result of tactical redistribu-
tion. When deciding the amount of infrastructure investment to carry out in a specific  region, 
the government takes into account its political reality but also some ‘objective’ economic 
criteria. Moreover, the government uses to be constrained to some extent by the ‘objective’ 
criteria set by the Constitution and other laws difficult to amend. In any case, inside the 
margin set by these constraints, the government will be forced to justify in front of both party 
followers and the general electorate which are the concrete criteria used. So, both the 
preferences of the voters and the ideology of the party will influence the implementation of 
these ‘objective criteria’. The important idea to retain here is that we are in the realm of pro-
grammatic redistribution, so redistribution could not operate without some sort of criteria.  
But, which are the possible criteria to use? On the one side, the government might 
consider to invest more where the are more users of the infrastructure (i.e., cars, trucks or 
miles driven, in the case of roads), which basically means investing in rich regions, or where 
there is a lower stock of capital (i.e, if the region is ‘rich’ but already has the appropriate road 
stock, it might not deserve more road investment). This kind of policy it is said to be 
‘efficiency-oriented’. However, either a constitutional mandate or the ideology of the govern-
                                                 
4 The above interpretative framework focuses on electoral politics, while it could be argued that Spanish politics 
are also influenced by post-electoral bargaining in the legislature. We do not deny this, but these forces have not 
been working during all the terms-of-office we analyse and its influence is less important quantitatively than the 
one of electoral forces, as results below will show.  
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ment might force the use of investment as an instrument of regional policy, the allocation 
going towards less developed regions. In this case, we will say that the investment policy is 
equity-oriented. According to Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), an efficiency-based rule would 
allocate infrastructure investment in proportion to regional income (i.e., GDP), and a rule 
which gives some weight to equity will allocate investment less than proportionally to 
income (and could even give more monies to poor regions). So, the elasticity of investment 
to income will inform us about the efficiency-equity trade-off (or taste for inter-regional 
redistribution) of a given government. Below we will provide a simple framework which will 
illustrate these ideas more precisely. 
This taste for redistribution will differ from country to country, depending on values 
and constitutional provisions (Wibbels, 2005). Democratic constitutions can be considered 
conceptually as a contract in which regions decide over future redistribution under uncer-
tainty about future incomes (Person and Tabellini, 1996; Bodenstein and Ursprung, 2005). 
That contract will influence redistribution both through the inclusion of some principles and 
mandates, but also trough the electoral rules that will provide poor people/regions with more 
influence than in an undemocratic setting (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Boix, 2003; Rodden, 
2009). Constitutions can also be considered as a contract between different regions that 
bargain in order to distribute the costs and benefits of the union (Weber and Le Breton, 2002; 
Spolaore, 2009). In the case of Spain, the 1978 Constitution directly calls for policies to 
enforce territorial equity (De la Fuente, 2004). Moreover, EU funds can be considered also a 
result of the constitutional arrangements of the country, in the sense that they are imposed 
from above and decided before the operation of national partisan politics. Some of these 
funds have a strong equity orientation (e.g., European Regional Development Fund, ERDF, 
Objective 1 regions), with highly redistributive rules constraining the internal allocation of 
funds between regions. From now on, we will use the term ‘constitutional’ to refer to this 
first set of influences on the taste for inter-regional redistribution. 
In any case, even after these institutional constraints, there will be room for the 
upcoming governments to try to influence the degree of redistribution. This means that in 
programmatic redistribution models, the government does not directly choose the money 
send to each district, but is constrained to act ‘as if’ he is choosing a taste-for-redistribution 
parameter (i.e., in the above discussion, the elasticity of investment to income). There are 
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several ways to address this problem. First, the median voter theory of redistribution (Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981) says that the amount of redistribution will be the one preferred by the 
median voter (here the median region) and thus will increase in the distance between median 
regional income and average regional income. Second, partisan theories of redistribution 
(see, e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) suggest that if left and right parties have different 
views regarding inter-territorial redistribution –and they cannot credibly commit to provide 
regional policies that the voters know are different to its preferred ones– they will probably 
implement different policies once in office. Third, in the probabilistic voting model of 
redistribution (e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000, ch. 6) no single voter (region, in our case) 
has the full power to determine the outcome (as in the median voter case) but the resulting 
taste for redistribution is a weighted sum of the tastes of the different income groups, the 
weights being the electoral power of each group. As in the tactical models introduced above, 
the regions with more electoral power are the swing regions. So these models say that 
redistribution will be higher if low income regions are swing regions. Empirically, the theory 
can be tested by focusing on the effect of the correlation between regional income and the 
incumbent’s vote margin of victory/defeat. Other variables related with regional ‘political 
power’ (e.g., marginal seat price, alignment or pivotal regions) can also be included in the 
power index, that can be then used to compute that correlation. In the rest of the paper, we 
will use the term ‘electoral’ to refer to this second set of influences on the taste for inter-
regional redistribution. 
A model of ‘constitutional’ programmatic redistribution. Following the approach of 
Berhman and Craig (1987) and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), suppose that the incumbent 
allocates investment across districts to maximize the following social welfare function 
                           { }J
j j jjjj
ii
iniyu nw
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     :s.t.    )(Max   
1
)(-1)( )(∑ ∑ == ςφςφ                          (6) 
Where jn  is the population of the j district. This is a CES social welfare function that allows 
varying degrees of relative regional inequality aversion. The φ parameter quantifies the 
aversion to regional output inequality, and its range of variation goes from  −∞ to one. As φ  
becomes more negative, inequality aversion increases. When φ → −∞, the function 
approaches pure equity. In the intermediate Cobb-Douglas case φ is zero. And if φ is equal to 
one, then the government is exclusively worried about efficiency. In this case, w equals 
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aggregate country’s utility, which reduces to aggregate output when using the utility function 
in (3) with ε=0. Note that we assume that this parameter depends on a vector of variables (ς ) 
which pick up what we have termed as ‘constitutional’ influences on the degree of aversion 
to regional inequality.  
The FOC of  problem (6) are 
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Using the same functional forms than in the previous section, we are able provide this 
expression for the amount of infrastructure capital desired by the incumbent for district j 
                                              ln   )(ln jjj yc σςφβ +=                                                  (8) 
This expression is similar to (5). The differences are the exclusion from (8) of the 
‘political power’ variables and the fact that now the output coefficient is multiplied by φ. 
This means that –if we consider the σ  parameter as basically constant across time and space– 
variations of the output elasticity of the capital stock across samples will be informative of 
differences in the degree of aversion to inequality, or ‘equity-efficiency’ trade-off, exempli-
fied by the φ parameter. For example, one could search for explanations for this ‘equity-
efficiency’ trade-off by allowing this parameter to be different in periods where different 
constitutional constraints apply. 
A model of ‘electoral’ programmatic redistribution. Let’s suppose now that ‘constitu-
tional’ norms do not totally fix the ‘taste for redistribution’ parameter, but only force the 
government to stick to some ‘objective’ criteria, defined from a formula which relates per 
capita investment and (relative) per capita income. To compare this scenario with the ones 
introduced above, we use the following simplified formulation 
                                                        φπ jj yi   =                                                                 (9) 
Whereπ  is a parameter which depends on the overall amount of investment funds available 
(which we consider, as before, fixed) and φ  is the ‘taste-for-redistribution’ parameter, which 
now is the decision variable. Taking into account the production function in (3), after some 
calculations, the effect of φ  on jy  can be written as 
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If we assume, to simplify, equal productivity parameters ( αα =j ) and instantaneous depre-
ciation (meaning that jj ic = ), expression (12) reduces to 
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Expression (12b) indicates that an increase in the efficiency orientation of public investment 
benefits rich regions. The incumbents’ problem can now be stated as 
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Taking (12b) into account, setting 0=ε , and defining the political weights jΨ as in previous 
sections, the FOC in (14) can now be expressed as 
                                         ∑∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛=Ψ −j jjj
j
*
j jjjj yyny
yyn ln 1ln 1 φλ                                     (15) 
Where αλπλ /* =  is a constant. Expression (15) says that, in equilibrium, φ  should be set in 
order to ensure that the resulting weights applied to the different income classes (i.e., 1/ φ−1jy ) 
matches the income pattern of political weights (i.e, the correlation between jΨ and jy ). 
Note that as φ  goes to zero the weights approach inverse income (i.e., 1/ φ−1jy ) while when φ 
=1 all the income classes receive the same unit weight. So, if rich regions become more 
powerful (i.e., the correlation between jΨ and jy  increases) φ should rise in order to make 
the weights less correlated with inverse income. Hence, this simple model predicts that the 
elasticity of infrastructure capital to income (the φ parameter) should be higher in samples 
(i.e., countries, time periods) where the positive (negative) correlation between ‘political 
power’ and income is higher (lower). This argument suggest an empirical relationship like 
                                           ln   )(ln jjj yc σρφβ +=                                                   (16) 
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Where )ψ( jj y,corr=ρ  is the correlation between ‘political power’ and per capita regional 
income. In the empirical analysis we will test this hypothesis along with others that have 
been identified above (i.e., median voter and partisanship).  
 
3. Empirical design.                   
General specification. Our purpose is to investigate which are the most relevant factors that 
have influenced the inter-regional allocation of public investment in Spain during the period 
1964-2004, both from the tactical and programmatic perspectives. Since we do not know in 
practice which of the above-presented models of inter-regional redistribution is more 
appropriate, we assume that the desired capital stock for district j is just a sum of the amounts 
determined considering either tactical or programmatic motives. Adding a time-subscript to 
the variables and also allowing φ varying in the time dimension, we have the following 
random-effects model 
                               jPjPPjttjtjt xυzyc +++= αφβ    ln  ln                                          (15a) 
                                               jttjjt ξβββ ++=              (15b)    
                                          tttt ζρφςφφφ +++= 210                                                  (15c) 
Where we have set 1 =σ  and jPPjt zα≅ψln . The variables included in jPz  capture the 
different tactical influences discussed above, which vary by term-of-office (P) but remain (in 
most of the cases, see section 3) constant for the years of a given term, and whose effect is 
allowed (at least in some specifications) to vary from one term to the other. The parameter 
jtβ  is an intercept which includes district ( jβ ) and time ( tβ ) effects and a random error term 
( jtξ ) with the usual properties. The time effects will be considered fixed, while the district 
ones will be treated as random, after using the Hausman test to check the appropriateness of 
this assumption. This fact allows us to include in the equation a set of time-invariant 
variables ( jx ) to pick up other economic and geographical influences on infrastructure 
investment, whose effect is also allowed (in some specifications) to vary from one term to the 
other. The ‘taste-for-redistribution’ parameter φt is also treated as a random coefficient, 
depending on variables picking up the ‘constitutional’ ( tς ) and ‘electoral’ ( tρ ) explanations 
of the degree of inter-regional redistribution, also including a random time effect ( tζ ). 
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In order to allow for the sluggish adjustment of the capital stock to both economic and 
political shocks, we model the dynamics of investment decisions with an autoregressive 
distributed lags model of order one, ADL(1,1), which we are able to express in its Vector 
Error Correction (VEC) form as 
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Where Pδ  is the sluggishness parameter, and contemporaneous and lagged income increases 
and a lagged capital stock increase have been added to the equation. Using the permanent 
inventory equation, this expression can be rewritten in terms of investment effort (ijt=Ijt/Cjt-1), 
computed as the ratio of investment and lagged capital stock 
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Where contemporaneous and lagged population increases have been added to the equation5. 
Stated in this way, the equation says that although the incumbent may prefer a given capital 
stock for a region, given its income and economic traits, in practice investment will evolve 
slowly towards this preferred capital stock and, moreover, that there might be short-term 
shocks temporarily affecting investment.  
Empirical strategy. We will proceed by steps. First, in order to provide evidence on the 
political variables which are most appropriate to account for tactical redistribution effects, 
we begin by estimating equation (17) with Spanish electoral district data for the entire 
democratic period (1978-2004). In this analysis, we keep the coefficients constant over time 
(i.e., δδ =P , φφ = t , '' αα =P  and ''P υυ = ). Second, in order to gauge the stability of these 
tactical variables over time we re-estimate equation (17) for several sub-periods. The results 
obtained will allow us to assess, for the different periods evaluated, the explanatory capacity 
of the political factors associated with tactical redistribution theories (included in the z 
vector), and to compute a summary ‘political power’ index to be used afterwards in the 
analysis of programmatic redistribution. These results will also allow us to provide a first 
                                                 
5 The permanent inventory equation says that Cjt=(1-ρ)Cjt-1+Ijt, where ρ is the depreciation rate; by rearranging 
this expression and after taking logs we find that ΔlnCjt=ln(1+Ijt/Cjt-1-ρ); the left hand side can be approximated 
by Ijt/Cjt-1-ρ  when this expression approaches zero. Finally, to arrive at (17), note that Δlncjt=ΔlnCjt -Δlnnjt. 
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assessment of the equity-efficiency trade-off implicit in the interregional allocation of 
infrastructure investment, and embedded in the φ parameter (see Castells and Solé-Ollé, 
2005). The value of this parameter in the different periods will allow us to guess which 
political factors associated with programmatic redistribution theories could explain the 
intensity of inter-regional redistribution (see section 2). Third, in order to provide a more 
formal test to these theories, we will re-estimate the model with data for the full period 
(1964-2004), including now both the democratic years (1978-2004) and the dictatorship 
period (1964-1977), treating now the φ parameter as random and making it depend on a 
number of variables that pick up both the ‘constitutional’ and the ‘electoral’ determinants of 
programmatic redistribution. 
Econometrics. There are several econometric concerns in estimating this equation. 
First, one should check that the random-effects model is to be preferred both to OLS and to 
fixed effects. So, we estimated these three specifications and used the Breusch-Pagan and 
Hausman tests to select the best model, which at the end turned to be the random-effects one, 
which was estimated by GLS. Second, while our dependent variable is measured annually, 
most of the right-hand side political variables are constant within a term-of-office, causing a 
well-known grouped variables problem6. Also, one of the political variables (i.e., partisan 
alignment, see section 3 below) is the same for all the districts belonging to the jurisdiction 
of a regional government, causing a similar problem. To avoid providing artificially low 
standard errors we include two additional random effects in (15b), one varying by district and 
term-of-office (i.e., jPβ ) and the other by year and regional government (i.e., tRβ )7,8.  
Third, the contemporaneous increase of income (i.e., jtyΔ ) could be endogenous, since 
the capital stock enters simultaneously as an argument in the production function and, even 
most important, because investment might have a direct multiplier effect on current regional 
economic activity. To account for this possibility, the model has been estimated by 
Instrumental Variables, using as instruments of tjy ,Δ  the five years lagged levels of per 
                                                 
6 See Smart and Milligan (2005) and Larcinese et al. (2008) for a discussion of this problem in a similar context. 
7 Note that geographical variables are constant though the entire sample. In this case, however, the inclusion of a 
random district effect jβ  is enough to ensure efficiency. 
8 This approach assumes common covariance structure across groups. However, the more flexible alternative of 
computing standard errors using the cluster-correlated Huber-White covariance matrix estimator has been shown 
to perform rather poorly when the number of clusters is small (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2004, and Dufflo et al., 
2004).  
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capita income and of the stock of human capital, computed as the average number of 
schooling years of the labour force (data coming from IVIE, 2007). Human capital can be 
plausibly considered as exogenous and had a substantial impact on regional growth in Spain 
during the period analyzed (Vives and De La Fuente, 1998; De La Fuente, 2002). These 
instruments were indeed valid, since the Sargan test showed that they were not correlated 
with the error term and the first-stage F-statistic was high. After instrumenting (see results 
below), the effect of Δyj,t  was positive but small and, in any case, not significant at a 
conventional level; more importantly, the estimated long-run income coefficient φ  did not 
change much. For this reason we did not include Δyj,t  in the subsequently estimated 
equations, obtaining thus a null contemporaneous impact effect of income on investment. 
These results suggest that it is difficult for the government to instantaneously adapt the 
allocation of investment to a region after a change in its characteristics (see also Castells and 
Solé-Ollé, 2005). This has an intuitive appeal because governments’ investment decisions are 
most likely to be based on the most recent data available from each region. These data 
generally will be for previous years, given that investment projects are included in the budget 
during its formulation.  
Fourth, one should check for the appropriateness of the lag structure in order to ensure 
that the error term is white noise. We estimated versions of the model with two and three lags 
of income, population and investment. The addition of these lags did not change much the 
results and we decided to keep the model simple for parsimony, since as we have explained, 
the model will be estimated both for the full period and for four-year periods, considerably 
reducing the number of observations available.  
 
4.- Data and variables 
Sample. In order to get a complete picture of the motives behind interregional redistribution 
in Spain, we first estimate equation (17) with data on the entire democratic period (i.e., years 
1978 to 2004). The year 2004 is the last one for which we have been able to collect the data 
on investment and capital stock at the electoral district level (i.e., ‘provincia’). We will use 
also the years 1964 to 1977, which belong to the pre-democratic period (i.e., Franco’s 
dictatorship). Our aim when including this period is to allow us to analyze the effect the 
democratic constitution over inter-territorial redistribution. We will divide the democratic 
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period in 8 sub-periods, corresponding to the terms of office of each of the Spanish 
governments since 1978. The first two sub-periods correspond to the right UCD governments 
(Unión de Centro Democrático, 1978-79 & 1980-82), the following four sub-periods are 
those of the left PSOE governments (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, 1983-86, 1987-89, 
1990-93 & 1994-96) and the last two to the two right PP governments (Partido Popular, 
1997-2000 & 2001-04). 
Dependent variable. Our data on infrastructure investment includes only economic 
infrastructures, which are the ones deemed to have stronger effects on growth (Montolio and 
Solé-Ollé, 2009). The data comes from a database elaborated by the Fundacion BBVA (El 
stock de capital en España y su distribución territorial (1964-2002)). This database provides 
information at the provincial level on investment made by the Spanish central government in 
roads, railroads, ports, airports and water projects, which are the categories that we include in 
our definition of infrastructure. Unfortunately, this database only provides information till 
1998. The new methodology used since then by the Fundación BBVA (El stock de capital en 
España y su distribución territorial (1964-2005). Nueva metodología) provides information 
on investment till 2004 but not by layer of government. In the case of road investment, the 
statistics elaborated by the Ministerio de Fomento (Anuario Estadístico) allow us to know the 
investment made by the central government in each province, so the database can be easily 
extended. For the remaining categories, we used two different procedures to extend the series 
of central infrastructure investment to the period 1999-2004. First, we distributed the 
investment made by the central government in each Autonomous Community (known from 
the statistics of the Ministerio de Fomento) between its provinces using the provincial 
investment share in the period 1995-98. Second, we also calculated for each province the 
average share of the central government in non-road investment for the period 1995-98, and 
multiplied investment in these categories in the following years by this percentage. The 
correlation between the two measures of central government’s investment obtained using 
these procedures is very high (0.987) and the results obtained are not affected by the concrete 
series we choose, so we decided to use an average of the two. Moreover, repeating our 
analysis using only road investment by the central government (here there are no 
imputations) does not alter the conclusions reached. Finally, performing the analysis with 
overall investment made by the central + regional governments (this information is available 
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for the full period) also provided the same qualitative results (as also happened in the study 
by Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
(Insert Figure 1) 
Figure 1 shows a time plot of the investment effort made by the Central + Regional 
governments and only by the Central government. The infrastructure investment effort was 
quite low during the dictatorship, increased with the arrival of the democracy, and 
experienced an abrupt increase with the arrival of the left government in 1982 and again in 
the second half of the 1980’s, with the reception of EU funds. Then, infrastructure 
investment decreased during the 1990’s, coinciding with the economic crises at the beginning 
of the decade and with the pre-Maastricht budget stabilization policy. Finally, infrastructure 
investment decreased again since 2000, due to the stringent deficit policy of the new right 
government. We also plot the evolution of the share of infrastructure investment funded by 
redistributive EU funds, where we mean by redistributive those funds that are rule-earmarked 
to poor regions and have been used to fund infrastructure projects; as a practical solution, we 
measure these funds by the monies coming from European Regional Development Funds 
(ERDF) Objective 1 and which have been used to fund these types of projects. The source of 
this data is the reports published yearly by the Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda. Note that 
the share of this infrastructure funded by the EU reached a peak of 19% in 1997 and 
decreased then to a 9% in 2004. This means that although these funds can not be reallocated 
from poor to rich regions, its limited share will probably allow to compensate rich regions by 
other means (of course, only when the government considers desirable to do it). The final 
plot included in Figure 1 is the ratio of Redistributive EU Funds to overall EU funds, which 
decreased since the very beginning, first because Objective 1 Funds represented a higher 
share of ERDF’s resources during the 1980’s than afterwards, and second as a result of the 
creation of the Cohesion Fund in 1993, which resources are not earmarked to infrastructure 
projects in poor regions. We will recover this evidence in section 5 to interpret the evolution 
of the redistributive intensity of infrastructure investment in Spain.  
Economic variables. The infrastructure capital stock used to compute the investment 
effort and also as a control variable, also comes from the Fundación BBVA database and is 
measured at 2000 prices. In this case the variable refers to the overall capital stock, and the 
information has never been provided by layer of government. The coefficient of this variable 
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can be interpreted as the share of the adjustment towards the desired capital stock which is 
implemented in a given year (see also Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). This parameter is 
crucial to estimate the long-run impact of income per capita over investment (calculated as 
the ratio between the income and the capital stock coefficients). 
The other economic control variables included are: income per capita, land area per 
capita, a coast dummy, an island dummy, a variables measuring climate (% days freezing) 
and terrain ruggedness (% land over 1,000 meters of altitude), and an indicator of the level of 
responsibilities in the provision of infrastructure retained by the central government in a 
given year. Income per capita is the GDP per capita at market prices, measured at 2000 
prices. The information comes from an old publication published yearly by BBV (La renta 
nacional de España y su distribución provincial, several years), and from the Spanish 
Regional Accounts published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es). The 
geographical variables have been taken form the Anuario Estadístico de España, also 
published yearly by INE. The indicator of the level of responsibilities have been computed 
after observing the concrete year when one regional government (Comunidad Autónoma, 
AC) has received an specific responsibility; before any responsibility has been transferred, 
the indicator for the provinces belonging to that AC is 1, and after the transfer is 1 minus 
Spanish investment in the transferred category over total Spanish infrastructure investment. 
We have to say now that the performance of most of these variables is rather poor; only 
income, the land area and the coastal dummy are statistically significant and show consistent 
results in most of the cases. Even the responsibility index is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels; this might be due to the fact that these responsibilities were transferred 
at similar moments to the different AC’s, with the result that the influence vanished once 
time effects have been included in the equation. So, our preferred specification will include 
only the three main economic controls. 
Political variables. We include four political control variables: Vote margin, Marginal 
seat price, Partisan alignment and Pivotal regional party. The information used to construct 
these variables comes from the website of the Ministerio del Interior (www.elecciones. 
mir.es). The variable Vote margin of victory/defeat in the last election aims to capture the 
influence of voters that are not particularly attached to the incumbent or to the alternative 
party/parties and, therefore, are more prone to change its vote in response to an economic 
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premium. This variable can be theoretically justified by assuming that the vote density 
function (i.e., fj in section 2) is single-peaked and symmetric. In this case, a higher vote 
margin (i.e., abs|vote share – 50%| always implies a lower density of votes (Case, 2000; 
Johanssen, 2003). Intuitively, the more distant the incumbent is from the 50% of the vote, the 
more difficult is for him to gain (or lose) additional votes. There are, however, some practical 
problems in implementing this idea. First, this theoretical prediction is based upon a model of 
bipartisan competition, while in Spain there are many parties concurring at the election in 
each district. Second, although there is some evidence for other countries that the vote 
density function is ‘approximately’ single-peaked it also seems to be asymmetric (see the 
results in Dalhberg and Johansson, 2004, for Sweden), meaning that the density might start to 
fall either below or above a 50% vote share. Third, as we explained in section 2, in practice 
the effects of the variable Vote margin can be confounded with those of vote share, which is 
the way scholars use to measure the alternative hypothesis that says that resources are 
allocated to the incumbent’s strongholds. All this suggests that the functional relationship 
between the vote share and investment should be empirically estimated, without imposing 
too much structure on the data. With this purpose we estimate a non-parametric median 
spline between the incumbent vote share in the last election and the residual of equation (17) 
as estimated including only the economic covariates. The results for the full sample and for 
various sub-periods (see Figure 2) show in all the cases an inverted U-shape, with a 
maximum amount of investment received at a point between 43% and 46% of the vote, with 
an average of 45% for the full period. The relationship is quite symmetric in the case of the 
first right governments (UCD between 1978 and 1982) and for the full democratic sample. 
The shapes for the leftist PSOE and for the rightist PP also follow this pattern but are more 
asymmetrical: that of the PSOE is flatter on the left side and that of the PP is flatter on the 
right side. In any case, these relationships suggest that the swing voter theory has some 
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appeal in Spain9 and that a Vote margin of victory/defeat computed as abs|incumbents’ vote 
share – 45%| can be an appropriate variable to use10.  
(Insert Figure 2) 
The second political variable included –Marginal seat price– uses the results obtained 
in the last election to compute exactly how many votes more/less are needed to win/lose an 
additional seat in the central legislature11. We follow Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005), who use 
a simple algorithm of the d’Hondt rule (which is the one used in Spain to translate votes to 
seats) to perform this calculus. The third political variable used, Partisan alignment, is a 
dummy indicating if the regional government is or not aligned with the central one. We 
consider the two governments to be aligned if they are controlled by the same party (either as 
a majority party or as the leader of a coalition). This is the variable that had a better 
performance in previous analysis of the effect of alignment in Spain (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas, 
2008). The last political variable is a dummy, Regional pivotal party. In practice, this dummy 
takes the value one for the provinces in Catalunya, País Vasco and Canary Islands, during the 
two minority governments of the 90’s (PSOE during 1993-96 and PP during 1997-2000). 
Previous analyses have shown that this variable is relevant (Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
 
5. Results 
Tactical redistribution. The results of the estimation of equation 1 for the full democratic 
period are presented in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation of the Random and 
Fixed effects models, respectively, including only those variables that have both cross-
                                                 
9 This does not mean, however, that we pretend that the core voter theory can be totally dismissed in the Spanish 
case. For instance, the shape obtained for the socialist party (i.e., PSOE), showing a flatter slope at a high vote 
share, suggests that this party ranks districts in the following order: (i) Swing districts (let’s say from 30% to 
50% of the vote), (ii) Incumbent’s strongholds (more than 50% of the vote), and (iii) Opposition strongholds 
(less than 30% of the vote). Disentangling in which circumstances (parties and elections) each type of behaviour 
is more relevant is outside the scope of this paper and deserves additional research efforts.  
10 We have also tried other estimations: (i) using a specific peak for each sub-period, (ii) allowing for 
asymmetric slopes at each side of the peak, and (iii) estimating a flexible spline function. In all the cases the 
results are qualitatively similar, so we have decided not to include them here. We have also estimated the 
median spline using the investment effort variable directly and using adding more controls to the first-stage 
regression; the results are similar to the ones presented here. 
11 In short, the algorithm separately performs two calculations: ads and subtracts votes to the incumbent party 
(and redistributes them to the ideologically closest party) till the last seat assigned to the incumbent changes (he 
win an additional seat or he looses the last one he has). The variable used is the minimum of these two variables 
(see Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005, for a discussion). 
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section and time series variation. The B-P test (Breusch-Pagan, 1980) rejects the poolability 
of the data, indicating the need to account for random effects in the model in order to ensure 
efficiency. Note also that the coefficients of the Random and Fixed effects models (columns 
1 vs 2) are fairly similar, the standard errors being higher in the Fixed effects case. The 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1974; bottom of column 2) confirms that the hypothesis that both 
sets of coefficients are equal can not be rejected, meaning that district effects are not 
correlated with explanatory variables and that the Random effects model is the appropriate 
one. A similar procedure has been used in the case of year effects, although the tests are not 
shown in the table. The year effects are statistically significant in all the cases and the 
Hausman test suggest that they are indeed correlated with the explanatory variables, so they 
should be treated as fixed. In columns 3 and 4 we show that the fit of the model improves 
when we add some time-invariant variables. In any case, even with these additional controls 
the B-P statistic still favours the use of a Random effects model. Our preferred specification 
is the one in column 3, since the additional controls included in column 4 are not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Columns (5) and (6) provide some additional checks on the 
appropriateness of our preferred specification of column (3). In column (5) we show what 
happens when we include the contemporaneous increase in income and population (as 
suggested by expression 17), and instrument income using the five-year lagged level of 
income and human capital stock. The Sargan test (bottom of this column) shows that these 
instruments are not correlated with the error term, and the partial F-test on the first-stage 
regression says that they have considerable explanatory power, since its value is higher than 
the threshold suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002). These results suggest that these two 
variables can be excluded from the model at no cost. Finally, column (6) illustrate the effects 
of including as explanatory variables a second lag of the investment effort and of the 
increases in income per capita and population. Note that a first lag of these variables has been 
included in all the specifications and that the Wald test (bottom of column 3) suggest that this 
increases the fit of the model. However, in the case of the second lag the Wald test suggest 
(bottom of column 6) that these variables are not statistically significant at conventional 
levels (the p-value is just 0.138) and can therefore be excluded from the specification.  
(Insert Table 1) 
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As for the results, the top panel of Table 1 shows that the four political variables have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant for the full period. Moreover, the size of the 
coefficients is of a considerable magnitude. For example, an increase of 10% in the 
incumbents’ Vote margin (e.g., a move from a peak vote share of 45% to either 35% or 55%) 
reduces the investment effort by 0.34% (e.g., if the mean investment effort is 6.1%, this 
would be reduced to 5.76%). Increasing one standard deviation in the variable Marginal seat 
price will reduce the investment effort a 1.56% (from 6.1% to 4.54%). Not being aligned 
with the central government or not being pivotal in the formation of the central executive will 
reduce the investment effort a 0.2% and a 0.5%, respectively (i.e., from 6.1% to 5.9% and 
5.6%, respectively).  
(Insert Table 2) 
Table 2 presents these results for each of the 8 terms-of-office of the Spanish 
democratic governments. We also provide these results for each of the parties that have been 
in power (UCD, right from 1978 to 1982; PSOE, left from 1983 to 1996; and PP, right from 
2000 to 2004), and also for the full democratic period. The top panel shows that the results of 
the Vote margin and Marginal seat price variables hold for the three different parties in 
charge and, with a couple of exceptions, for each one of the terms-of-office. PSOE left 
governments seem to have been a little less influenced by these tactical considerations. The 
coefficients for the UCD right governments seem to be the strongest ones. The alignment 
results only hold (at conventional statistical significance levels) in the PSOE case, the 
coefficients being of the expected sign but not statistically significant under the PP12. The 
pivotal party results also hold in all the cases, although they are also stronger in the case of 
the PSOE. Albeit showing some period heterogeneity, the results from Table 2 clearly 
confirm that tactical considerations have been in general quite important in Spain during all 
the democratic years. 
Programmatic redistribution. The bottom panel of Tables 1 and 2 analyse the effect of 
economic variables on investment effort. The results suggest that investment effort is lower 
the higher the previous level of capital stock. For the full democratic period, the capital stock 
coefficient suggests that investment closes each year a 7.2% of the gap between actual and 
                                                 
12 Note that these variables are not included in all the terms-of-office, the reason being that these phenomena are 
specific of the considered periods (i.e., it has no sense to talk about alignment before 1983 and there are only 
two governments that have been conditioned by pivotal regional parties).  
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desired capital stock. This number is higher during the PSOE governments and lower during 
the PP ones, surely reflecting the different amounts of funds assigned to infrastructure 
investment at different moments. The results shown also say that the central government 
invests more in regions with less density of population and on the coast (although  the  
coefficient is not statistically significant in all the sub-periods), taking into account the 
differential spending needs and/or costs of these areas (see also Castells et al, 2006). Any 
attempt to account for other factors, related either to needs/costs (e.g., climate, terrain 
ruggedness) or responsibilities has been unsuccessful. 
Investment effort is affected positively by income, to the exception of the PSOE1 and 
PSOE2 terms-of-office (see Table 2). The row below the income results shows the equity-
efficiency trade-off parameter (φ), with values that are positive and lower than one for most 
of the sub-periods, to the exception of the two aforementioned left governments, that display 
negative but modest values. In relative terms, the UCD governments had an efficiency 
orientation (φ = 0.662), but they were the first governments to implement the new demands 
for redistribution that arose with democracy; note, for instance, the quasi-absolute efficiency-
orientation of infrastructure investment during the dictatorship (φ = 0.902). Also the recent 
right governments (PP, between 1997 and 2004) have been more efficiency-oriented (φ = 
0.678) than the previous left ones (PSOE, between 1983 and 1997), which put more 
emphasis on equity (φ =0.039). However, in no case the regional allocation of investment 
was fully efficient (this requires φ = 113).  
The value of this parameter for each sub-period is also shown in Figure 3, which also 
plots the estimated φ  value for each of the years of the sample. The inspection of the figure 
suggests several explanations to the time evolution of the value of this equity-efficiency 
trade-off. First, the arrival of democracy brought the first impulse to equity in the allocation 
of infrastructure investment. Second, left governments are more redistributive (equity-
oriented) than right governments. Third, the maximum level of interregional redistribution 
occurred with the first PSOE left government. To understand this, recall that PSOE won the 
1983 election by a huge margin; this fact, coupled with the desire to implement a long-
delayed ideological program (this was the first left government in nearly half a century) 
                                                 
13 Recall that in order to carry out this interpretation one has to set σ =1, since φ can not be formally identified. 
This means that some of the interpretation made in the text, regarding if the investment allocation is or not 
‘efficient’ should be taken with caution. This, however, does not invalidate our analysis, since we focus on a 
comparison between different time periods, which we believe is legitimate if σ is more or less constant. 
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could explain this intense equity orientation14. Fourth, the next redistributive impulse 
occurred in the PSOE 3rd term of office (1989-93), conditioned by the huge amount of EU 
funds that were earmarked to poor regions since the accession of Spain to the European 
Community. Fifth, the last PSOE government (1994-96) and the PP ones (1997-2004) sought 
an increase in the orientation of infrastructure investment towards efficiency. To understand 
the causes that might explain this result recall that, as shown in Figure 1, the amount of EU 
funds which were earmarked to poor regions and used to fund infrastructure investments 
decreased through time. This was due both to a decrease in the relative amount of money 
allocated to ERDF Objective 1 regions, and to the creation of the Cohesion Fund in 1993.  
But of course, there could be other explanations that can not be detected from a bird-
eye inspection of the data. For instance, some of the programmatic redistribution theories 
(see section 2) suggest that the level of redistribution in a democratic system will be the one 
preferred by the most powerful group of citizens. This group could be either the median 
income region or a weighted sum of all the regions, where the weights reflect the ‘political 
power’ of each one. In our case, powerful could mean a lower Vote margin, a lower 
Marginal seat price, that the regional and central governments are aligned, or that regional 
parties are pivotal in the formation of the central executive. Thus, different theories lead to 
different predictions. If the median voter theory is true in our context, we should observe that 
the efficiency orientation of the government (i.e., φ)  should increase as the ratio between 
median and average income increases. The other possibility is that the efficiency orientation 
of the government increases as the ‘political power’ of the electoral districts is less negatively 
correlated with income/is more positively correlated with income. That is, when poor/ rich 
regions become less/more powerful the degree of redistribution is reduced.  
Table 3 presents the coefficients of the slope function tttt ζρφςφφφ +++= 210 , which 
have been estimated by means of a Random coefficients model. This procedure is an attempt 
to test in a more systematic way the different hypotheses introduced up to the moment. Table 
3 presents the long-run coefficient of the income variable ( 0φ ), once identified dividing the 
income coefficient by the long-run sluggishness parameter (δ), and the long-run coefficients 
on the interactions between income and the tς  and tρ  variables, identified in the same way. 
                                                 
14 See Boix (1998) for an analysis of the role of infrastructure investment in the ideological program of PSOE 
during those years. 
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However, the equations also include all the variables used in Table 1 and 2, which are 
omitted here to save space. The Wald test shown at the bottom of the table indicates that the 
adding the interactions improve the fit of the model. Also the Likelihood Ratio test suggests 
that it is appropriate to consider the φ coefficient as random. 
(Insert Table 3) 
In the first column of Table 3 we test the so-called constitutional explanations for 
redistribution; that is, the hypotheses that say that the inter-territorial redistribution is 
basically affected by the arrival of democracy and of the EU funds. The results in column 1 
do in fact show that the equity-efficiency trade-off was on average higher during the 
dictatorship (φ = 0.654, picked up by the constant term) than in the democratic period (φ = 
0.44, computed as the sum of the coefficient of Democracy and the constant term). 
Moreover, these differences are statistically significant. Also, the proportion of Redistributive 
EU Funds over infrastructure investment reduces the efficiency orientation of that 
investment. For each percentage point of Redistributive EU Funding the φ  coefficient is 
reduced by 0.015. This means that at the peak of EU infrastructure funding in 1997 (where 
this share was the 19%) the predicted value of φ  was 0.127 (= 0.654 – 0.244 – 0.015 × 19) 
and at the end of the period (where this share was just the 9%) the value of φ  was 0.275. 
These results suggest that the arrival of EU funds had a sizeable effect on this redistribution. 
In the second and third columns we present the result of what we call the partisan 
explanation for redistribution. The results in column 2 show a negative and strongly 
statistically significant coefficient for the Left variable. While a right democratic government 
has a predicted φ  coefficient of 0.537 (= 0.659 – 0.122), the same parameter takes a value of 
0.113 (= 0.659 – 0.122 – 0.424) for a left one. Column 3 tests a variant of the partisan theory, 
which states that ideology is mediated by the degree of electoral competition. We expect that 
in contested elections left parties will redistribute less (than they would do in uncontested 
elections) and right parties will redistribute more. We test this hypothesis by interacting the 
Left and Right dummies with a Contested election dummy, which takes a value of one for the 
years where the incumbent expected a narrow margin of victory/ defeat at the next general 
election and zero otherwise. The margin is computed as the absolute value of the difference 
between the incumbent’s expected vote share and 38%, which is approximately the minimum 
vote share with which a Spanish government has been able to form government. The 
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expected vote share is the average between the intended vote share for the incumbent at the 
moment of approving the budget (so, last trimester of the previous year) and the intended 
vote share at the middle of the execution period (so, second trimester of the current year), as 
provided by the CIS (‘Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas’) polls. Then, we consider that 
the margin is narrow if it is less than 8%, which is the median margin for all the years in the 
sample. With this procedure, the Contested election dummy takes the value 1 for the years 
1979-80, 1983-92 and 2002 onwards15. As can be seen in the table, Left governments still 
redistribute much less than the Right ones if the election is uncontested (the coefficient of the 
Left dummy without interactions is negative and statistically significant). However, we 
observe now that Right governments redistribute more in contested than in uncontested 
elections. In fact, the φ coefficient drops by –0.220 between these two situations.  
The fourth column of Table 2 tests the Median Voter theory of redistribution. However, 
the results are rather disappointing. The coefficient of the ratio between median and average 
regional income is not only statistically insignificant but its sign is opposed to the expected 
one. Other trials, adding the square of this ratio (searching for a kind of Kuznets curve, 
Kuznets, 1955) did not provide satisfactory results. Finally, the fifth column of Table 2 tests 
the hypothesis that the degree of redistribution is affected by the correlation between 
‘political power’ and income per capita, ρ(Power, Income). We compute our measure of  
(relative) ‘political power’ as a geometrically weighted average of the variables Vote margin, 
Marginal seat price, Partisan alignment and Pivotal regional party, with weights which are 
specific to each term-of-office (see Table 2)16. The results suggest that this variable has a 
positive and statistically significant effect over redistribution. Additional results, disentan-
gling this variable in its different components and not displayed here, show that all of them 
have a positive and significant effect. An additional intriguing effect of the inclusion of this 
variable is that the coefficients of both Democracy and EU Funds are no longer statistically 
                                                 
15 The low competition observed in the period 1981-82 was due to the demise of the UCD government, which 
intended vote dropped from 40% at the end of 1979 to 26% at the end of 1980 and to 10% at the end of 1982 
(just before the elections won by the PSOE); the low competition during 1983-92 was due to the landslide 
victory of the PSOE in 1982, which had an intended vote share of 60% in 1984 and still of 50% in 1992; finally, 
the intended vote share was also quite high (46%) during the years 2000 and 2001 (just before and after of the 
elections that allowed the formation of a right single-party government). 
16 The results regarding this variables are virtually unchanged if the weights used are the same for all periods in 
the case of the variables Vote margin, Marginal seat price and Pivotal regional party,  but the performance of 
this variable less satisfactory if one imposes a unique weight on the Partisan alignment variable, which is the 
one with more heterogeneous results. 
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significant at conventional levels. The results for the ideological variables remain the same. 
This would mean that the degree of inter-territorial redistribution is at a practical level less 
determined by constitutional rules and laws that try to channel funds towards less developed 
regions, but depends basically on the ideology of the party in office and on the electoral 
incentives that this party faces in each election.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Central governments have considerable discretion in the allocation of infrastructure invest-
ment across regions. Being this the case, it is natural to expect that pork barrel influences 
(what we call tactical redistribution) do shape (at least partly) the regional allocation of 
investment. In this paper we have shown that, after controlling for important economic traits 
of Spanish electoral districts (income, capital stock, land area), the districts that are more 
‘politically productive’ still receive disproportionately high amounts of investment. These 
districts are those were there is a high proportion of swing voters (voters that are not specially 
attached to any of the parties), were the ‘marginal price of a seat’ is low (less votes are 
needed to win an additional seat), were the regional government is controlled by the same 
party than the central one, or were there are regional parties that are pivotal in the formation 
of the central executive. 
However, we also argued that it is not true that infrastructure investments are fully 
discretionary and, therefore, that programmatic redistribution theories explain also a part of 
the story. The equity orientation of the regional allocation of infrastructure investment is 
conditioned by constitutional rules, understood in a broad sense, including both the mandate 
of the Spanish Constitution but also the effects of EU policies. These rules constraint the 
investment allocation possibilities, forcing politicians to design formula-based allocations 
based basically on regional income. This is the realm of programmatic regional redistribu-
tion, where the government basically determines the weight given to income in the allocation 
of investment, what we call his equity-efficiency trade-off or ‘taste for redistribution’. We 
have shown in the paper that the long-run effect of income on the investment effort is lower 
than one, meaning that the allocation of investment is not only efficiency-oriented17. The 
                                                 
17 The excessive orientation towards equity of the Spanish regional allocation of investment has also been 
pointed out by other authors (see, especially, De la Fuente, 2004 and 2007). 
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weight given to equity was very low during the dictatorship, increased with the arrival of the 
democracy and, especially, after the first left government, and again after EU Funds began to 
flow to Spain. In the paper we try to test these highly intuitive explanations against some 
others derived from several theories of programmatic redistribution. We show that both the 
Democracy and EU Funds did have some effects over inter-territorial redistribution, but that 
these effects vanished after accounting for politics. Ideology seems to be a more powerful 
determinant of the equity orientation of infrastructure investment, left government 
redistributing much more than right ones. Also, redistribution seems to decrease as less 
developed regions lose some of its early ‘political power’.  
Overall, the results suggest that the allocation of infrastructure investment in Spain is 
less constrained by rules than is generally believed, and much more influenced by politics, 
both by particularistic politics (tactical redistribution) but also by programmatic 
considerations (programmatic redistribution) that end up influencing how formulas are 
determined. To conclude, just to say that the reason that a region receives less investment 
that it deserved are basically two: (i) the region has low ‘political power’, so it will receive 
less monies that other regions with the same ‘objective’ traits, and (ii) the regions’ peers 
(e.g., if the region is poor, the other poor regions, if it is rich the other rich regions) have low 
‘political power’, so the overall pattern of redistribution runs against the interest of the region 
(if it is poor, the allocation is too efficiency-oriented, if it is rich, too equity oriented). A 
really intriguing question is why the central government tries to buy votes trough the 
programmatic design of investment policies or intergovernmental grants instead of using 
more particularistic spending. After all, it is much cheaper to please a given poor region 
which is especially powerful, than to channel more funds to all the poor regions (some of 
them might not be that powerful, even when the average poor regions are). Probably, the 
reason for the use of programmatic rather than tactical redistribution is that the government 
can make only limited use of discretionary funds (not respecting any a priori established 
‘objective’ criteria), because otherwise the electorate and/or the media will notice it.  
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Figure 1: 
Infrastructure investment (as a % of capital stock) in Spain 1964-2004. 
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Notes: (1) Inv./Stock: Central + Regional government infrastructure investment (as 
a % of infrastructure capital stock); Central. Inv.Stock: Central government 
infrastructure investment (as a % of infrastructure capital stock); Red.EU.Funds 
/Inv.: EU Funds earmarked to poor regions (measured as ERDF Objective 1 
Funds) & used to fund infrastructure investment as a share of  Central + Regional 
government infrastructure investment; Red.EU.Funds/EU.Funds: EU Funds 
earmarked to poor regions & used to fund infrastructure investment as a share of 
total EU funds used to fund infrastructure investment. (2) Investment on the left y-
axis and EU funds on the right y-axis. 
Data Sources: (1) Fundación BBVA (2004, 2007) for investment and capital stock; 
(2) Ministerio de Economia y Hacienda (several years) for EU funds. 
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       Figure 2: 
              Relationship between Infrastructure investment (as a % of capital stock) 
            and incumbent vote-share in Spain, Median spline for different periods 
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Notes: (1) x-axis: incumbent’s vote share; y-axis: median 
spline of  infrastructure investment (as a % of capital stock); 
(2) estimation method: median spline estimation using as 
dependent variable the residual of a regression between 
infrastructure investment, economic controls (GDP per 
capita, capital stock, land area, coast) and year dummies; (3) 
See Figure 2 for Party acronyms and Data sources. 
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Figure 3: 
Equity-efficiency trade-off (φ) for infrastructure investment.   
Spain, Period 1964-2004 and sub-periods 
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Notes: Equity-efficiency trade-off (φ) is the ‘long-run’ elasticity of investment to 
income, obtained after estimating a regression between infrastructure investment 
(as a % of infrastructure capital stock) and GDP per capita, controlling for the 
capital stock and other economic and political covariates (see Notes of Table 1 for 
additional methodological details). Dotted line are the term-of-office specific 
estimates (Table 2) and the Bold line the year estimates using the coefficients of 
Table 3. 
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      Table 1:  
Economic and political determinants of the regional allocation of infrastructure investment in Spain. 
Democratic period (1978-2004). Dependent variable i=I/C-1. Obs.= 26×50(T×N)=1,300 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 GLS-  
Random 
effects 
OLS- 
Fixed  
effects 
GLS- 
Random 
effects 
GLS- 
Random 
effects 
IV-  
Random 
effects 
GLS- 
Random 
effects 
(i) Political factors 
Vote margin (in %) 
 
-0.030 
(-7.15)*** 
-0.029 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.034 
(-7.15)*** 
-0.034 
(-7.18)*** 
-0.031 
(-6.83)*** 
-0.030 
(-7.12)*** 
Marginal seat price (×10-4) -0.019 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.021 
(-2.14)*** 
-0.026 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.025 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.024 
(-2.93)** 
-0.023 
(-2.23)*** 
Partisan alignment 
 
0.002 
(1.86)* 
0.002 
(1.55) 
0.002 
(1.83)* 
0.002 
(1.78)* 
0.002 
(1.70)* 
0.002 
(1.66)* 
Regional pivotal party 
 
0.005 
(3.45)*** 
0.005 
(2.24)** 
0.005 
(3.21)*** 
0.005 
(3.10)*** 
0.005 
(3.34) *** 
0.005 
(3.02)*** 
(ii) Economic factors 
ln(Capital stock p.c)  
 
-0.068 
(-15.35)*** 
-0.069 
(-6.22)*** 
-0.072 
(-15.71)*** 
-0.072 
(-15.55)*** 
-0.070 
(-13.44)*** 
-0.068 
(-15.36)*** 
ln(Income p.c.)  0.031 
(4.88)*** 
0.030 
(2.55)** 
0.034 
(4.88)*** 
0.033 
(4.25)*** 
0.032 
(4.25)*** 
0.030 
(4.17)*** 
φ  [s.e. ] 0.456 
[0.064]*** 
0.435 
[0.134]***
0.472 
[0.074]***
0.472 
[0.087]***
0.457 
[0.083]*** 
0.441 
[0.092]***
ln(Land area p.c.) 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.004 
(7.96)***
0.004 
(7.45)***
0.004 
(6.99)*** 
0.004 
(7.77)***
Coast 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.003 
(4.98)*** 
0.003 
(4.94)*** 
0.003 
(4.65)*** 
0.003 
(4.42)*** 
Island 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.011 
(-0.981) 
--.-- --.-- 
%  Days freezing --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.001 
(0.123) 
--.-- --.-- 
%  Land over 1000 m --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.002 
(0.187) 
--.-- --.-- 
Responsibilities 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 0.696 
(1.221) 
--.-- --.-- 
Δ ln(Income) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.005 
(1.554) 
--.-- 
Δ ln(Population) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.323 
(1.123) 
--.-- 
R2 0.478 0.397 0.499 0.501 0.518 0.510 
F-test [p-value] 18.23 [0.00] 14.68  [0.00] 20.11 [0.00] 25.88 [0.00] 24.43 [0.00] 23.56 [0.00]
B-P LM-test (Var(u)=0) 56.33 [0.00] --.-- 45.22 [0.00] --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Hausman test (fe vs.re) --.-- 10.00 [0.35] --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Sargan  test (inst. validity) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 1.35 [0.37] --.-- 
1st stage F-test (weak inst.) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 25.22 [0.00] --.-- 
Wald test (1-year lags) --.-- --.-- 35.78 [0.00] --.-- --.-- --.-- 
Wald test (2-year lags) --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 6.75  [0.138]
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District fixed effects NO YES NO NO NO NO 
1-year lags  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2-year lags NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels;  standard 
errors and p-values in brackets; (2) φ= equity-efficiency trade-off, computed as the ratio between the coefficient of 
income and that of the capital stock (in absolute value); (3) B-P LM-test (Var(u)=0) = Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier test of the appropriateness of the random effects model, distributed as a χ2(1); (4) Hausman test (fe vs.re) = 
Hausmant test of the appropriateness of the random vs the fixed effects model, distributed as a χ2(k) with k=number of 
variables; (5) Sargan test = test of validity of the instruments, distributed as a χ2(k) with k=number of added 
instruments; (6) 1st stage F-test = added instruments’ partial F-statistic of the first-stage regression; (7) Wald (1-year 
lags) & Wald (2-year lags) = Wald test son the significance of 1-year (Δln(Income-1), Δln(Population-1, i-1=I/C-1) and 2-
year (Δln(Income-2), Δln(Population-2, i-2=I/C-2) lagged variables, distributed as a χ2(k). 
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Table 2:  
Economic and political determinants of the regional allocation of infrastructure investment in Spain: (1964-2004 and subperiods). Dep. variable i=I/C-1.   
Period: 1978-79 1980-82 1978-82 1983-86 1987-89 1990-93 1994-96 1983-96 1997-00 2001-04 1997-04 1978-04 1964-77 
Regime/Party UCD1 UCD2 UCD PSOE1 PSOE2 PSOE3 PSOE4 PSOE PP1 PP2 PP Dem. Dic. 
(i) Political factors 
Vote margin (in %) 
 
-0.162 
(-3.66)*** 
-0.102 
(-3.76)***
-0.147 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.144 
(-1.57) 
-0.172 
(-3.34)***
-0.106 
(-2.23)** 
-0.122 
(-1.77)* 
-0.057 
(-2.33)***
-0.075 
(-2.13)***
-0.127 
(-2.71)***
-0.079 
(-2.17)***
-0.034 
(-7.15)***
--.- 
Marginal seat price (×10-4) -0.005 
(-2.38)*** 
-0.004 
(-5.36)***
-0.005 
(-2.51)*** 
-0.002 
(-2.46)***
-0.002 
(-1.24) 
-0.002 
(-2.22)** 
-0.001 
(-2.10) *** 
-0.001 
(-3.87)***
-0.003 
(-5.30)***
-0.002 
(-1.39) 
-0.005 
(-5.61)***
-0.026 
(-2.71)***
--.-- 
Partisan alignment 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 0.003 
(1.65)* 
0.010 
(2.31)*** 
0.014 
(1.89)* 
0.007 
(1.55) 
0.005 
(2.19)*** 
0.003 
(1.34) 
0.004 
(1.54) 
0.004 
(1.20) 
0.002 
(1.76)* 
--.-- 
Regional pivotal party 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.014 
(2.14)** 
0.012 
(2.51)*** 
0.006 
(2.23)** 
--.-- 0.006 
(2.20)** 
0.005 
(3.21)*** 
--.-- 
(ii) Economic factors 
ln(Capital stock p.c.)  
 
-0.077 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.063 
(-2.72)***
-0.068 
(-3.13)*** 
-0.049 
(-10.25)***
-0.101 
(-11.31)***
-0.103 
(-5.91)***
-0.089 
(-7.77)*** 
-0.084 
(-13.28)***
-0.048 
(-2.14)** 
-0.077 
(-3.90)***
-0.042 
(-4.94)***
-0.072 
(-15.71)***
-0.079 
(-12.89) 
ln(Income p.c.)  0.050 
(3.04)*** 
0.028 
(2.70)*** 
0.045 
(5.72)*** 
-0.010 
(-3.11)***
0.008 
(3.47)*** 
-0.004 
(-2.15)** 
0.005 
(1.81)* 
0.003 
(4.00)*** 
0.028 
(4.82)*** 
0.027 
(4.56)*** 
0.025 
(4.04)*** 
0.034 
(4.88)*** 
0.071 
(6.92)*** 
φ  [s.e. ] 0.685 
[0.236] 
0.440 
[0.163] 
0.662 
[0.166] 
-0.205 
[0.041] 
0.082 
[0.018] 
-0.038 
[0.019] 
0.058 
[0.034] 
0.039 
[0.011] 
0.580 
[0.181] 
0.732 
[0.203] 
0.678 
[0.170] 
0.472 
[0.074] 
0.902 
[0.113] 
ln(Land area p.c.) 
 
0.006 
(0.231) 
0.005 
(0.110)
0.007 
(0.328)
0.021  
(4.38)***
0.015 
(4.51)***
0.031 
(6.16)***
0.022 
(4.14)***
0.023 
(2.75)***
0.008 
(0.654)
0.010 
(0.654)
0.009 
(0.543)
0.004 
(7.96)***
0.004 
(0.871) 
Coast 
 
0.003 
(0.120) 
0.003 
(0.098) 
0.002 
(0.134) 
0.009 
(2.89)*** 
0.008 
(1.60) 
0.004 
(1.13) 
0.019 
(4.56)*** 
0.005 
(2.34)** 
0.002 
(0.221) 
0.001 
(0.189) 
0.003 
(0.320) 
0.003 
(4.98)*** 
0.002 
(1.210) 
R2 0.398 0.391 0.393 0.546 0.620 0.515 0.512 0.550 0.235 0.239 0.228 0.333 0.276 
F-test [p-value ] 
 
13.40 
[0.00] 
18.50 
[0.00] 
15.02 
[0.00] 
28.18 
[0.00] 
31.68 
[0.00] 
27.71 
[0.00] 
26.23 
[0.00] 
29.23 
[0.00] 
9.21 
[0.00] 
9.78 
[0.00] 
8.70 
[0.00] 
28.68 
[0.00] 
9.871 
[0.00] 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels; standard errors and p-values in brackets; (2) φ= equity-efficiency trade-off, 
computed as the ratio between the coefficient of income and that of the capital stock (in absolute value); (3) Method of estimation: GLS(random effects) with time effects and 1-year lags of 
income, population and investment effort (i.e., Δln(Income)-1, Δln(Population)-1  &  i-1=I-1/C-2).   
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Table 3:  
Determinants of the Equity-efficiency trade-off (φ) in the regional allocation of 
 infrastructure investment, Spain 1964-2004. Dependent variable i=I/C-1.  
Obs.= 26×50(T×N)=1,300. ML-Random coefficients estimation 
 (1) 
Constitutional 
(2) 
Partisan 
(3) 
Partisan 
(4) 
Median 
voter 
(5) 
Political 
power 
Constant 
 
0.654 
(7.36)*** 
0.659 
(7.88)*** 
0.653 
(7.95)*** 
0.724 
(9.37)*** 
0.811 
(16.80)*** 
Democracy 
 
-0.244 
(-2.66)*** 
-0.122 
(-1.82)* 
-0.010 
(-1.93)* 
-0.112 
(-1.55) 
-0.100 
(-1.46) 
Red. EU Funds / Investment 
 
-0.015 
(-5.77)*** 
-0.004 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.005 
(-3.41)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.67)*** 
-0.002 
(-1.210) 
Left 
 
--.-- -0.423 
(-10.25)*** 
-0.599 
(-14.56)*** 
-0.574 
(-10.68)*** 
-0.546 
(-13.57)*** 
Left × Contested election 
 
--.-- --.-- 0.082 
(0.73) 
0.081 
(0.74) 
0.123 
(0.50) 
Right × Contested election 
 
--.-- --.-- -0.220 
(-4.60)*** 
-0.234 
(-4.86)*** 
-0.216 
(-4.99)*** 
Median income/Income 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- -0.012 
(-0.72) 
--.-- 
ρ(Power, Income) 
 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 0.332 
(4.57)*** 
Wald test [p-value ] 77.13  
[0.00] 
105.98 
[0.00] 
123.96 
[0.00] 
124.15  
[0.00] 
134.42 
[0.00] 
Wald test (interactions) 19.22 
 [0.00] 
45.25 
[0.00] 
66.87  
[0.00] 
67.00  
[0.00] 
78.11  
[0.00] 
LR test (vs. linear regression) 
 
45.13 
 [0.00] 
45.98 
[0.00] 
43.96  
[0.00] 
48.15   
[0.00] 
48.42 
 [0.00] 
Notes: (1) z-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels; 
standard errors and p-values in brackets; (2) Method of estimation: GLS-Random coefficients, the table 
showing the estimated function ttt ρφςφφφ 210 ˆˆˆˆ ++= of expression (15), obtained after dividing all the 
coefficients by the estimated sluggishness parameter; (3) All the equations include as controls: all the political 
and economic variables shown in Table 2 plus time effects and an 1-year lags of income, population and 
investment effort;  (4) Wald & Wald (interactions) = tests on the joint statistically significance of all the 
variables in the equation and of the interaction terms, respectively; (5) LR test (vs. linear regression) = 
Likelihood Ratio test of the appropriateness of considering random coefficients, distributed as a χ2(k) with 
k=number of random coefficients; (5) Red.EU.Funds/Investment = share of infrastructure investment funded by 
European Union redistributive funds (see Figure 1 for a definition); Left = PSOE executives (1983-1996); 
Contested election = election with an a priori uncertain outcome; Median Income/Income = ratio between 
median GDP per capita and average GDP per capita; ρ (Power, Income) = correlation between political power 
and GDP per capita = weighted sum of Electoral margin, Marginal seat price, Partisan alignment & Pivotal 
regional party, with weight obtained from previous estimations (Table 2). 
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